In the last two decades, diseussions have proliferated regarding the existenee and nature of universals. Three broad schools of thought about universals (with varieties of eaeh) are eurrently being defended.! In order to elarify these three different positions and to focus the dialectie whieh follows, let us eoneentrate on issues involving monadie universals and the phenomenon of quality agreement.
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Consider two round and red spots called Socrates and Plato.
Socrates and Plato have the same inft.mae species of redness and roundness. Further, let us refer to the redness of Socrates and the redness of Plato as red! and redz, respectively. How are we to explain such eases of quality agreement? Extreme Nominalism is one answer to this question. Extreme Nominalists deny the existenee of qualities altogether by giving them a reductive analysis such as a biconditional of this type:
a has the quality F ~ P For example, P could be replaced by "a is a member of the set of F-things". Thus, the Extreme Nominalist denies an ontology of qualities and quality-instances and only allows for concrete partieulars -red balls, individual humans -and sets (predieates, 2. It is not relevant for our purposes to analyze attempts 10 reduce concrete particulars to space-time worms, since such space-time worms and specific spatiotemporal slices of them are still particu1ars which generate problems about universals and their instances. Thus, we will bypass these issues and continue to refer to concrete particu1ars in the more traditional way.
A second school of thought is called Nominalism. A Nominalist acknowledges the existence of qualities but denies that quality agreement is to be explained along Realist lines wherein qualities are taken to be universals. The Nominalist denies that the redness of two exactly similar red balls, e.g. redl and red2, is a numerically identical entity in each. Rather, each ball has a particular entity that is not multiply exemplifiable -a little red. "Uni versals" are sets or some other sort of grouping of qualityinstances in which each member of the set stands to each other member in a relation of exact similarity (and this relation is itself a particular), and quality-in-stances are themselves particulars which are called, among other things, "tropes", "abstract particulars", "perfect particulars", "cases", "unit properties", or "moments".3 Proponents of Nominalism inc1ude D. C. Williams, G. F. Stout, and Keith Campbell. 4 In my opinion, Campbell is the most articulate Nominalist currently writing on the subject. According to Campbell, the "universal" redness is a set whose members are all and only the abstract particulars -he calls them tropes -which stand to one another in the relation of exact similarity. Further, the relation between the "universal" redness and red l and red2 is the E of set
